

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 JERUSALEM 528

NODIS

FROM ATHERTON

USDEL NO 25

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PGOV, XF, US

SUBJ: MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER DAYAN-SATURDAY-FEBRUARY 25

1. SUMMARY: IN MEETING WITH DAYAN FEBRUARY 25, I BRIEFED HIM AND HIS COLLEAGUES IN GENERAL TERMS ON MY MEETINGS IN EGYPT AND CONVEYED THE LATEST EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL FOR THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES. IN PRESENTING THE LATEST EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL FOR THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, I INDICATED WE HAD BEEN INSTRUMENTAL IN TURNING THE EGYPTIANS AROUND FROM PUTTING FORWARD PROPOSALS THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN A GOOD DEAL WORSE. DAYAN SAID HE THOUGHT A DECLARATION MIGHT INDEED BE DOABLE, BUT HE RETURNED REPEATEDLY TO THE QUESTION THAT HAS BECOME AN IDEE FIXE FOR HIM LATELY: DOES SADAT HAVE A CLEAR CONCEPTION OF WHAT HE PLANS TO DO WHEN THE DECLARATION IS ACHIEVED AND IT TURNS OUT THIS IS AN INSUFFICIENT BASIS TO BRING HUSSEIN IN? I AGAIN TOLD HIM I COULD NOT GIVE ANY MORE DEFINITIVE ANSWERS TO THIS THAN PREVIOUSLY BUT SADAT CLEARLY SEES THE DECLARATION AS A NECESSARY STEP FOR FUTURE PHASES OF NEGOTIATIONS AND CLEARLY ATTACHES IMPORTANCE TO HUSSEIN'S PARTICIPATION. ON THE DECLARATION I MADE THE SUGGESTION THAT

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AS THE NEXT STEP HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES PUT ASIDE THE PALESTINIAN PARAGRAPH FOR THE MOMENT AND LOOK CLOSELY AT THE OTHER PARAGRAPHS WHERE THEY AND THE EGYPTIANS HAD ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE IN AN EFFORT TO DECIDE WHAT FOR THEM WAS ESSENTIAL TO RETAIN AND WHAT WAS MARGINAL. ON THE PALESTINIAN PARAGRAPH I SAID IT WAS OUR JUDGMENT THAT SUBSTANTIALLY THE ASWAN LANGUAGE WAS THE ONLY LIKELY COMPROMISE, AND THAT I THOUGHT EGYPT IN THE

END COULD MOVE TO IT IF ISRAEL WOULD. THIS ELICITED NO PARTICULAR COMMENT FROM DAYAN. WE LEFT IT THAT HE AND HIS TEAM WOULD TRY TO HAVE SOMETHING FOR US IN WRITING ON THE DECLARATION BY THE TIME I LEAVE FOR CAIRO ON TUESDAY. END SUMMARY.

2. I MET FOR 1-1/2 HOURS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER DAYAN THE EVENING OF FEBRUARY 25 AT HIS RESIDENCE IN TEL AVIV. PRESENT ON THE ISRAELI SIDE WERE BARAK, EVRON, LAVIE, ROSENNE, RUBEN-STEIN; ON US SIDE WERE AMBASSADOR LEWIS, STERNER, KORN, SHERMAN AND KIRBY.

3. AMBASSADOR LEWIS OPENED THE MEETING BY SAYING THAT HE HAD BEEN DISTURBED BY A LEAK OF THE DISCUSSION THAT ATHERTON HAD HAD WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ON HIS LAST TRIP, AND HE HOPED WE COULD DO BETTER WITH RESPECT TO THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE PRESENT MEETING. SMILING DAYAN SAID YOU ARE LOOKING AT THE WRONG MAN BUT HE SAID HE WOULD TALK TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND STRESS THE NEED FOR CONFIDENTIALITY. I SUPPORTED SAM'S REMARKS GIVING AS A CONCRETE EXAMPLE THE FACT THAT MY INFORMAL SUGGESTION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A SUB-COMMITTEE APPEARED IN THE ISRAELI PRESS AS AN ISRAELI SUGGESTION WHICH PRACTICALLY KILLED THE IDEA AS FAR AS THE EGYPTIANS WERE CONCERNED BEFORE I COULD EVEN DISCUSS IT WITH THEM.

4. I SAID THAT I HAD BROUGHT BACK WITH ME SOME SPECIFIC EGYPTIAN LANGUAGE ON THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES WHICH I
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WOULD GET TO IN A MINUTE BUT FIRST I WANTED TO MAKE A FEW GENERAL COMMENTS ABOUT MY MEETINGS IN EGYPT. I HAD FIRST MET WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER WITH ONLY BOUTROS GHALI AND FOREIGN MINISTER'S OFFICE DIRECTOR, AHMED MAHER PRESENT. THIS WAS A GOOD CONSTRUCTIVE TWO-HOUR MEETING. I HAD BEEN IMPRESSED WITH THE INCREASED EASE AND CONFIDENCE THAT MARKED THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S PERFORMANCE. KAMEL INDICATED THAT SADAT WANTED TO MEET WITH ME BUT SAID THIS MIGHT NOT BE POSSIBLE ON THIS VISIT BECAUSE HE HAD A BAD COLD AND WAS SEEING PRACTICALLY NO ONE. I HAD HENCE BEEN SURPRISED THE NEXT MORNING TO RECEIVE THE MESSAGE THAT SADAT WANTED TO SEE ME THAT DAY.

5. WITH RESPECT TO MY MEETING WITH SADAT, I SAID I THOUGHT I WOULD WAIT UNTIL MY MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER TO GIVE A FULL REPORT OF SADAT'S REMARKS BUT WOULD MAKE A FEW GENERAL COMMENTS NOW. I FOUND THAT THE CYPRIOT MATTER WAS WEIGHING HEAVILY ON SADAT'S MIND. HE WAS PREOCCUPIED WITH THIS AND CLEARLY DEPRESSED AT THE OUTCOME. DAYAN BROKE IN TO ASK WHETHER IT HAD BEEN THE PLO'S PARTICIPATION, OR THE CLASH BETWEEN HIS MEN AND THE CYPRIOT FORCES THAT SEEMED TO DEPRESS HIM. I REPLIED THAT IT WAS MY IMPRESSION IT WAS THE MILITARY DEFEAT HIS COMANDO FORCE HAD SUFFERED. HE WAS VERY MAD AT

THE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT AND OBVIOUSLY HAD REACTED STRONGLY.

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FROM ATHERTON

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6. CONTINUING ABOUT THE GENERAL ATMOSPHERE OF MY MEETING WITH SADAT, I SAID ONLY KAMEL HAD BEEN PRESENT ON THE EGYPTIAN SIDE. MOST OF THE MEETING HAD BEEN TAKEN UP WITH SADAT TALKING AND MY LISTENING. A LOT OF THE FAMILIAR THEMES HAD BEEN STRESSED. HIS DISAPPOINTMENT WITH ISRAEL'S RESPONSE TO HIS INITIATIVE ONCE AGAIN CAME THROUGH STRONGLY. AT THE SAME TIME SADAT MADE IT CLEAR HE WANTED TO SEE THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS CONTINUE AND THAT HE SUPPORTED MY MISSION.

7. WITH RESPECT TO MY MEETING WITH KAMEL THE DAY BEFORE, I TOLD DAYAN I HAD BEEN IMPRESSED WITH THE SERIOUSNESS OF PURPOSE I FOUND. THEY CLEARLY WANTED TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES. I HAD STRESSED ISRAEL'S DESIRE TO HAVE EGYPT'S LATEST FORMULATION. I TOLD DAYAN I HAD STRESSED TO THE EGYPTIANS THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE SERIOUS ABOUT MAKING PROGRESS ON A DECLARATION. I HAD ALSO BRIEFED THE EGYPTIANS ON THE US-ISRAELI DISCUSSIONS ON THE APPLICABILITY OF 242 ON ALL FRONTS. I COMMENTED THAT THIS HAD BEEN OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO THE EGYPTIANS SINCE THEY SEE IT AS KEY TO THE NEXT POLITICAL COMMITTEE AGENDA ITEM. I SAID I HAD PROBLEMED EGYPTIAN IDEAS ON THE WEST BANK/GAZA ISSUE BUT HAD RECEIVED
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THE REPLY THAT EGYPT WAS RELUCTANT TO GET INTO DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT IN ADVANCE OF JORDAN JOINING THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE EGYPTIANS DO NOT FEEL THAT THEY HAVE A MANDATE TO DISCUSS THIS SUBJECT UNILATERALLY. KAMEL HAD URGED THAT I TRY TO GET SOME IDEAS FROM HUSSEIN AS A FIRST STEP. I THEN DESCRIBED FOR DAYAN MY TENTATIVE ONWARD SCHEDULE AND FACT THAT I WOULD BE ARRIVING IN AMMAN FOR DISCUSSIONS ON MARCH 3.

8. I ALSO REPORTED TO DAYAN THAT I HAD PUT TO THE EGYPTIANS ISRAEL'S PROPOSAL FOR THE RECONVENING OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE. IN MY MEETING WITH SADAT, SADAT HAD NOT BEEN EXPLICIT ONE WAY OR THE OTHER BUT I WAS RELUCTANT TO READ TOO MUCH INTO THIS. HE HAD NOT SAID NO, BUT HE HAD NOT SAID YES, THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE CAN CONVENE IMMEDIATELY. IT WAS NOT MY PRESENT IMPRESSION, I SAID, THAT SADAT WOULD BE WILLING TO RECONVENE BEFORE WORK ON THE DECLARATION WAS COMPLETED.

9. TURNING TO THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, I PASSED OUT COPIES OF THE NEW EGYPTIAN LANGUAGE (GIVEN ME IN CAIRO BY KAMEL FEBRUARY 1, BUT NOW DATED FEBRUARY 23), AS I DID SO I EXPLAINED THAT WE HAD HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD BEEN MOVING TO AN EVEN HARDER VERSION WHICH WOULD HAVE INCLUDED SOME ELEMENTS OF THE EGYPTIAN DRAFT DECLARATION IN ISMAILIYA, SUCH AS SPECIFYING THE SPECIFIC AREAS FROM WHICH WITHDRAWAL HAD TO TAKE PLACE. I THOUGHT OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE EGYPTIANS PAST COUPLE OF WEEKS HAD BEEN USEFUL IN KEEPING THEIR THINKING IN MORE CONSTRUCTIVE CHANNELS. I NOTED THAT THE PRESENT DRAFT DID NOT CONTAIN ANYTHING ABOUT WITHDRAWAL HAVING TO BE FROM "ALL FRONTS" ALTHOUGH THIS IS CLEARLY EGYPTIAN INTERPRETATION OF 242 AND THEY ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO IT. I SAID I HAD PRESSED THE EGYPTIANS ON WHY THEY WANT TO REINSERT THE PHRASE ABOUT THE INADMISSABILITY OF THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY WAR STRESSING TWO POINTS: (A) THAT THE
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EGYPTIANS WERE IN FACT ATTEMPTING TO MAKE OPERATIONAL WHAT IS A PREAMBULAR CLAUSE IN SC RESOLUTION 242 AND (B) THAT IT WAS HIGHLIGHTING THIS PARTICULAR POINT IN AN UNBALANCED WAY TO SELECT IT FOR INCLUSION WHEN MANY OTHER ELEMENTS OF RESOLUTION 242 WERE NOT MENTIONED IN THE DECLARATION. BUT THE EGYPTIANS HAD INSISTED THAT THIS PHRASE SHOULD BE INCLUDED. ON EGYPT'S LANGUAGE FOR THE PALESTINIAN PARAGRAPH, I NOTED THAT THE EGYPTIAN TEXT OBVIOUSLY WENT BEYOND OUR ASWAN FORMULATION.

10. DAYAN ASKED, SUPPOSE WE REACH AGREEMENT ON THIS PAPER, WHAT COMES NEXT? WILL THE JORDANIANS COME IN? HE DIDN'T THINK JORDAN WOULD BE SATISFIED WITH THIS PAPER. WOULD THE EGYPTIANS INSIST ON THE PHYSICAL PRESENCE OF JORDAN IN THE NEGOTIATIONS?

HE MENTIONED AN ALLEGED STATEMENT BY SECRETARY VANCE DESCRIBING THE PURPOSE OF THE DECLARATION AS BROADENING THE NEGOTIATIONS TO INCLUDE SYRIA AS WELL AS JORDAN. DAYAN SAID THAT WOULD IMPOSE A COLOSSAL BURDEN ON THE PRESENT STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS. HE HAD BEEN SURPRISED BY THIS STATEMENT BECAUSE WHEN HE SAW THE PRESIDENT THE LATTER HAD SAID SADAT HAD NOT EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN HAVING SYRIA JOIN THE NEGOTIATIONS. WAS THERE NOW SOME CHANGE IN THIS ASSESSMENT? I SAID NONE WHATSOEVER. DAYAN REITERATED HIS CONCERN ABOUT EGYPTIAN INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO JORDAN. HE COMMENTED HE THOUGHT THAT AGREEMENT COULD PROBABLY BE REACHED ON A DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES BUT WHAT WAS THE POINT OF GOING TO THIS TROUBLE IF ISRAEL COULD NOT BE CERTAIN THAT EGYPT WOULD THEN PROCEED TO GO ALONG WITH ISRAEL?

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FROM ATHERTON

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11. I SAID THE EGYPTIANS CLEARLY WANT TO GET HUSSEIN INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER WHO SEES IT AS THE KEY TO FURTHER STAGES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, SADAT ALSO SAYS LET'S GET HUSSEIN INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT HE SEEMS SOMEWHAT MORE WILLING TO CONTEMPLATE GOING AHEAD ON THE DECLARATION WITHOUT GETTING AN ADVANCE COMMITMENT FROM HUSSEIN THAT HE WILL JOIN ON ONE BASIS OR ANOTHER. I SAID THAT AS I HAD TOLD DAYAN IN NEW YORK MY IMPRESSION WAS THAT SADAT HAS PROBABLY NOT MADE UP HIS OWN MIND DEFINITELY ON THIS POINT. IN THE MEANTIME HE SEES THE DECLARATION AS MARKING A DEFINITE STAGE OF PROGRESS THAT WILL OPEN DOORS TO FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS TO INCLUDE JORDAN. HE ALSO SPEAKS IN GENERAL TERMS OF THE NEED TO BRING THE PALESTINIANS

IN.

12. DAYAN ASKED WHAT I THOUGHT THE NEXT STEPS WERE. I SAID MY SUGGESTION WAS THAT THE ISRAELI TEAM PUT ASIDE THE PALESTINIAN PRAGRAPH FOR THE MOMENT. THEY MIGHT TURN TO THE OTHER PARAGRAPHS -- MAINLY PARAGRAPHS 2, 4 AND 6 -- AND TRY TO DECIDE, ON THOSE POINTS ON WHICH THE EGYPTIANS HAD ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE, WHAT IN THEIR VIEW WAS MOST IMPORTANT TO RETAIN AND WHAT WOULD BE SECRET

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MORE MARGINAL. I SAID I HAD ASKED THE EGYPTIANS TO GO THROUGH THE SAME EXERCISE. WITH RESPECT TO THE PALESTINIAN PARAGRAPH, I SAID THAT IT WAS MY OWN JUDGMENT, SHARED BY WASHINGTON, THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO EVENTUALLY MOVE SUBSTANTIALLY TO THE ASWAN LANGUAGE TO GET AN ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISE. ALTHOUGH THE EGYPTIANS WERE ASKING FOR SOMETHING THAT WENT BEYOND THE ASWAN LANGUAGE, IT WAS MY IMPRESSION THAT IN THE END THEY COULD PROBABLY ACCEPT THIS, WHICH THEY ALREADY CONSIDER A COMPROMISE FROM THEIR PREFERENCE FOR UNFETTERED SELF-DETERMINATION. THEY FEEL THAT ANYTHING LESS THAN THE ASWAN LANGUAGE WOULD NOT GIVE THEM THE UMBRELLA THEY NEED WITH RESPECT TO DEALING WITH OTHER ARABS TO PROCEED TO FURTHER STAGES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. I ASKED DAYAN AND HIS TEAM TO REFLECT ON THIS AND SAID I WOULD WELCOME THEIR THOUGHTS BY THE TIME OF MY DEPARTURE, NOW SCHEDULED FOR THE MORNING OF FEBRUARY 28.

13. DAYAN INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD DO THIS. HE SAID IT ALL COMES BACK TO THE QUESTION DOES SADAT HAVE A CONSISTENT STRATEGY. DOES HE KNOW WHAT HE WILL DO IF WE GET THE DECLARATION AND HUSSEIN DOESN'T COME IN? OR IS HE JUST PROCEEDING STEP BY STEP AND THEN SEEING WHAT HAPPENS? I SAID I THOUGHT SADAT HAD A VERY CLEAR IDEA OF WHAT HE WANTS BUT IT WAS FRAMED IN RATHER GENERAL TERMS IN HIS MIND. BUT THE IDEA IS THAT HE NEEDS TO DISCHARGE EGYPT'S RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE OTHER ARABS AND SEES THIS AS BEING ACCOMPLISHED BY THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES. DAYAN ASKED WHETHER THE EGYPTIANS HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS. I SAID THE SUBJECT HAD COME UP AT VARIOUS POINTS DURING MY CONVERSATIONS, PARTICULARLY IN SADAT'S REFERENCE TO THE SINAI SETTLEMENTS AS INCONSISTENT WITH THE SPIRIT OF HIS INITIATIVE, BUT THIS ISSUE HAD NOT BEEN PROMINENT IN MY TALKS WHICH FOCUSED ON THE DECLARATION.

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14. ROSENNE INTERVEND TO SAY THAT HIS PERUSAL OF THE NEW

EGYPTIAN SUBMISSION INDICATED IT WAS "MUCH WORSE" THAN EVEN THE DRAFT WHICH THE EGYPTIANS HAD BROUGHT WITH THEM TO THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE TALKS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE LINKAGE BETWEEN PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION IN DETERMINING THEIR FUTURE AND THE TALKS IN WHICH THE PALESTINIANS WOULD PARTICIPATE -- A FEATURE OF THE ORIGINAL EGYPTIAN SUBMISSION AT THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE-- HAD BEEN DROPPED BY PUTTING THESE POINTS IN SEPARATE SENTENCES. HE BEGAN TO MENTION A NUMBER OF OTHER SPECIFIC WORDING CHANGES WHICH HE CONSIDERED FOR THE WORSE WHEN DAYAN STOPPED HIM. I SAID THAT THE LATEST EGYPTIAN DRAFT WAS IN OUR OPINION MUCH BETTER THAN WHAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD BEEN THINKING OF PUTTING FORWARD.

15. CONCLUDING THE MEEGING, DAYAN SAID HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES WOULD BE PUTTING SOMETHING IN WRITING BUT WOULD WAIT TO DO THIS UNTIL AFTER MY MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER SINCE THAT DISCUSSION MIGHT BEAR ON THEIR PROPOSAL. I SAID THAT WAS FINE, BUT POINTED OUT THAT THE NATURE OF WHAT I HAD TO SAY TO THE PRIME MINISTER DID NOT AFFECT THE ESSENTIAL ISSUES THAT HAD TO BE DEALT WITH IN THE DECLARATION. I HOPED THE ISRAELIS WOULD BEGIN TO WORK ON THEIR IDEAS AND TO BE AS CREATIVE AS POSSIBLE. I SAID ALTHOUGH I THOUGHT IT APPROPRIATE TO GET TO CAIRO SOMETIME TUESDAY, I COULD DELAY MY SCHEDULED DEPARTURE THAT MORNING IF DAYAN WANTED TO HAVE A FINAL MEETING WITH ME THAT DAY.

16. REQUEST DEPARTMENT REPEAT THIS MESSAGE TO AMMAN, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JIDDA AND TEL AVIV.
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Message Attributes

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Draft Date: 26 feb 1978
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